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 On May 4, 2017, recently elected President Trump released the “Presidential Executive 
Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty” (“Executive Order”).1 The Executive Order 
announced a broad commitment to religious freedom, claiming that its policy will protect religious 
liberty the way the founders intended.2 The Executive Order also instructed Attorney General, at 
that time Jeff Sessions (“Attorney General”), to issue guidance to all executive departments and 
agencies interpreting these expanded ideals of religious liberty protections.3  
 On October 6, 2017, the Attorney General released a memorandum (“AG’s Memo”) to all 
of the executive departments and agencies in response to the Executive Order.4 The AG’s Memo 
set forth twenty principles to aid all of the executive departments and agencies to carry out 
President Trump’s mission to a broadened commitment to religious freedom.5 The AG’s Memo 
recognized religion as a fundamental liberty that extends to churches, persons, and businesses.6 
The AG’s Memo further recognized the demanding strict scrutiny standard in the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)7 and that it is applicable to individuals, nonprofit 
organizations, and even some for-profit corporations.8 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
RFRA was interpreted broadly; it deferred to the religious claimant’s definition of burdensome 
 
1 Exec. Order No. 13798 § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order]. 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Memorandum from Jeffrey Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Law Protections for Religious 
Liberty (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001891/download [hereinafter 
Memorandum]. 
5 Id. at 1.  
6 Id. at 2.  
7 Id. at 3; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993). 
8 See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.  
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regulations, thus extending RFRA to apply to at least some for-profit businesses.9 The AG’s Memo 
also acknowledges that the government may not interfere with the autonomy of a religious 
organization and that religious employers are entitled to make employment decisions in 
accordance with their religious tenets.10  
 The Executive Order and AG’s Memo lead us to the topic of this paper. On August 15, 
2019, the Federal Register (The Daily Journal of the United States Government) published a notice 
of newly proposed regulations.11 The United States Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) proposed regulations (“DOL Regulations”) to 
clarify the scope of the religious exemptions under section 204(c) of Executive Order 11246.12 
Before discussing the DOL Regulations, it is important to note that in 2014 President Obama 
signed off on Executive Order 13672, amending Executive Order 11246 to include protections for 
employees of federal contractors on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.13 In 
contrast, the DOL Regulations will allow federal contractors with religious beliefs to make 
employment decisions on the basis of those beliefs without losing their eligibility to be a federal 
contractor, which undoubtedly impacts President Obama’s Executive Order 13627.14 In clarifying 
the scope of the religious exemptions, the DOL Regulations seek to add definitions to the following 
 
9 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
10 See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.  
11See generally Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption, 
84 Fed. Reg. 41677 (proposed Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 CFR 60) [hereinafter Implementing Legal 
Requirements]. 
12 Id. (One year after President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he signed Executive Order 11246. This 
order required equal employment opportunities in federal government contracting. Two years later, President 
Johnson expanded Executive Order 11246 to coincide with Title VII in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex 
and religion. Around a decade later, the authority to enforce Executive Order 11246 was integrated into the DOL. 
Following that, in 2002, President Bush amended Executive Order 11246 to include Title VII’s exemptions for 
religious organizations). 
13 See generally 41 CFR 60 (2014). 
14 See generally Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11. 
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terms: Religion; Particular Religion; Religious corporation, association, educational institution, 
or society; Exercise of Religion; and Sincere.15 
 These newly defined terms would provide broad religious exemptions to for-profit 
institutions that are federal contractors.16 In articulating the DOL Regulations, the OFCCP, 
prompted by the administration’s mandate under the Executive Order and AG’s Memo, drew 
further influence from Title VII case law and recently decided United States Supreme Court cases 
as reminders of the federal government’s duty to protect the freedom of religion.17 When 
interpreting these regulations, one could pose two questions: 1. Are the DOL Regulations a 
necessary implication of Hobby Lobby? And 2. Are the DOL Regulations extending the autonomy 
doctrine, normally applied to churches and nonprofits to protect their internal operations from 
government intrusion, to for-profit organizations?  
 If our analysis concludes that the DOL Regulations are a necessary implication of Hobby 
Lobby, that means that the DOL is merely establishing a strict scrutiny standard at the executive 
level extending to religious for-profits.18 However, if we reject that contention and instead 
conclude that the DOL Regulations are an extension of the autonomy doctrine, normally applied 
to churches and nonprofits, we have a much more problematic conclusion.19 And this problematic 
conclusion is the correct conclusion. The DOL Regulations are not a necessary implication of 
Hobby Lobby. Rather, the DOL Regulations are an extension of the autonomy doctrine to for-profit 
institutions. If a business claims it is operated according to religious principles, then its 
 
15 Id. at 41679.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 41678.  
18 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 
(1993).  
19 See generally Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor 
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981) (Summarizing the significance of 
applying the autonomy doctrine to churches and nonprofits). 
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employment decisions might be unreviewable under such a doctrine. Therefore, the DOL 
Regulations should be withdrawn because 1. They will dilute the autonomy doctrine as applied to 
churches and nonprofits, 2. They will harm members of the LGBTQ, women, and minority groups 
in the workforce, 3. This religious autonomy could extend to non-religious moral claims and even 
larger businesses, and 4. There is value in having a diversified workplace.   
 This paper will proceed as follows: Part I addresses the impact that the Hobby Lobby 
decision has had on businesses, as well as the recently adopted Religious Exemption and Moral 
Exemption for certain businesses.20 This part further addresses the role RFRA plays in these 
particular contexts. Part II explores the autonomy doctrine by providing examples of case law on 
how, in particular, the ministerial exception and Title VII exemption are distinct, yet relate to the 
common protection of institutional autonomy for churches and nonprofits. Part III examines the 
DOL Regulations and explores their potential real-life application. This part further demonstrates 
that these regulations are not an implication of Hobby Lobby, but rather, expanding institutional 
autonomy to for-profits. Part IV then assesses that the DOL Regulations should be withdrawn 
because the rules are, in fact, autonomous protections to for-profits. This part further analyzes how 
the reasoning for withdrawing the DOL Regulations is to avoid diluting the autonomy doctrine, to 
prevent harm to certain individuals of our society, to avoid the potential expansion of religious 
autonomy to non-religious moral claims and larger businesses, and the implications of future 
morals clauses in for-profit employer’s employment contracts with employees. Furthermore, this 
part looks at the valuable policy of having a diversified workplace.  
 
20 See infra note 29; see also infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Impact on Businesses Following Hobby Lobby and the Religious Exemption 
and Moral Exemption to Contraceptive Coverage Under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act 
 In 2014, the United States Supreme Court held in Hobby Lobby that RFRA applies to 
regulatory actions of closely held for-profit corporations.21 This holding is derived from a 
challenge to regulations promulgated under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), through the 
guidance of the Obama administration.22 Under these regulations, employer-provided health 
insurance plans were required to provide particular preventative services which included any 
contraceptive coverage approved by the Food and Drug Administration.23 Plaintiffs, who were 
owners of closely held for-profits, successfully challenged this contraceptive coverage mandate, 
arguing that it was a violation of RFRA.24 Hobby Lobby argued that the Health and Human 
Services’ (“HHS”) contraceptive mandate substantially burdened Hobby Lobby’s religious 
beliefs.25 The Court stated that if the HHS contraceptive mandate was to survive a RFRA challenge 
and overcome Hobby Lobby’s substantial burden, a compelling government interest needed to be 
shown that HHS’ mandate was the least restrictive alternative to requiring that certain closely held 
for-profits provide contraceptive coverage.26 The Court concluded, limiting the holding to the 
facts, that the HHS mandate requiring employers to provide contraceptives violated RFRA in 
substantially burdening Hobby Lobby’s free exercise of religion.27  
 
21 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 683; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993) (The purposes of RFRA are “(1) to 
restore the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to 
provide a claim of defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the government”).  
22 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 701.  
25 Id. at 686.  
26 Id. at 726.  
27 Id. at 686-687. 
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 On November 15, 2018, the Federal Register published two new final rules from HHS, the 
Department of the Treasury, and the DOL for Religious Exemption and Moral Exemption from 
providing coverage of certain preventative services under the ACA, such as contraceptive 
coverage.28 The first rule, the Religious Exemption, provides that entities that have a sincerely held 
religious belief against providing contraceptive coverage are exempt from the original ACA 
mandate requiring them to provide such coverage.29 Entities that fell under this rule included 
churches, nonprofits, and for-profit entities that are both not publicly traded and publicly traded.30 
The second rule, the Moral Exemption, provides that certain entities that have non-religious moral 
convictions against providing contraceptive coverage may also exempt themselves from the ACA 
mandate requiring them to provide such coverage.31 Entities that fell under this rule included 
nonprofits and for-profit entities that are not publicly traded.32 Although both rules allow the 
original ACA contraceptive accommodation to be available through the entity’s insurer or a third 
party administrator, that option is left entirely to the entity.33 Both of these rules were enacted in 
light of RFRA and were articulated by the Trump administration as the appropriate response to the 
substantial burden the Court found in Hobby Lobby.34 
 
28 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Fact Sheet: Final Rules on Religious and Moral Exemptions and 
Accommodation for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act (Nov.7, 2018), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/11/07/fact-sheet-final-rules-on-religious-and-moral-exemptions-and-
accommodation-for-coverage-of-certain-preventive-services-under-affordable-care-act.html [hereinafter U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, Fact Sheet].   
29 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); see also Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57592 at 57545 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 45 
C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018) [hereinafter Religious Exemption]. 
30 Id.  
31 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018); see also Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57592 at 57604 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 
147.133 (2018) (Defining “moral convictions” based from Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), as those: 
“(1) that the individual ‘deeply and sincerely holds’; (2) ‘that are purely ethical and moral in source and content’; (3) 
‘but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty’; (4) and that ‘certainly occupy in the life of that individual a place 
parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious persons,’ such that one could say ‘his beliefs function as a 
religion in his life’”) [hereinafter Moral Exemption]. 
32 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018). 
33 See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Fact Sheet, supra note 28.  
34 See Religious Exemption, supra note 29.  
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II. The Autonomy Doctrine 
The autonomy doctrine, also known as the “church autonomy doctrine,” “church autonomy 
principle,” and the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,” is derived from the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.35 An essential theme of the autonomy 
doctrine is to protect churches and nonprofits from secular judicial interference in religious 
matters, particularly in the area of employment.36 Courts will defer to churches in their 
relationships with clergy and other employees in ways not available to secular employers.37 For 
instance, sometimes employees of churches and nonprofits are required to accept a morals clause 
in their employment agreements with their employer.38 These clauses can seek to regulate the 
conduct of an employee based on an employer’s religion, ethics, or morals.39 Religious employers 
can seek to regulate not only an employee’s professional life, but an employee’s personal life as 
well, because of the protection of church autonomy.40 
 Other times, employees find themselves fired or demoted based on what they feel is 
discriminatory. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., the 
Court recognized the ministerial exception and found that interfering with a church’s decision to 
hire or fire a minister infringed on that church’s internal governance violating the Free Exercise 
Clause.41 Furthermore, the Court found that granting the state the power to determine which 
 
35 See Mitchell Waldman, J.D., III. Jurisdiction of Courts; Prohibition Against Court Interference with Internal 
Affairs, 45 FLA. JUR. 2d Religious Societies § 11 (Sept. 2019 Update). 
36 Id. 
37 See Angela C. Carmella, After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious For-Profit” And The Limits Of The Autonomy 
Doctrine, 80 MO. L. REV. 381, 399-402 (2015). 
38 See Josh Scharff, Morals Clauses: What They Mean For Employees Of Religious Institutions, Peer Gan & Gisler, 
LLP, (Jul. 31, 2014), http://peerganlaw.com/morals-clauses-what-they-mean-for-employees-of-religious-institutions/ 
(Summarizing what a “morals clause” within an employment contract is and the impacts that these provisions have 
had).  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).  
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individuals will be ministers to a given faith violates the Establishment Clause by involving the 
government in ecclesiastical decisions and that this authority should be left to the church itself.42 
The Court noted Hosanna-Tabor’s holding was limited in that the ministerial exception bars a 
minister’s employment discrimination lawsuit in an attempt to legally challenge their church’s 
decision to terminate them.43 However, the term minister has been broadly interpreted by courts 
covering various occupations throughout a religious organization.44 In essence, employees that are 
considered ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception are legally precluded from bringing 
any employment discrimination suit based on sex, race, pregnancy, national origin, and all other 
legally protected classes.45 
 In addition to the ministerial exception, Title VII provides an exemption for religious 
organizations under section 702.46 Under this exemption, a religious employer can make decisions 
that discriminate on the basis of religion regardless of whether the nature of the employment was 
religious or secular, providing no legal remedy for employees under religious discrimination 
doctrine.47 In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos,  plaintiff’s Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit against their religious employer for 
terminating them after the plaintiffs failed to qualify as church members was unsuccessful due to 
section 702.48 The Court held that applying section 702’s exemption to secular nonprofit activities 
 
42 Id. at 188-189. 
43 Id. at 196 (The Court declined to rule whether the ministerial exception would bar any other kind of employment 
action, such as a breach of contract or tort action).   
44 See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012) (Barring a former music director’s 
employment discrimination lawsuit under the ministerial exception); see also Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, 
863 F.3d 190 (2nd Cir. 2017) (Barring a former principal’s employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit under 
the ministerial exception). 
45 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171; see also Carmella, supra note 37, at 400.  
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1.  
47 Id.; see also Carmella, supra note 37, at 402. 
48 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).  
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of a religious organization did not violate the Establishment Clause.49 Obviously grounded in the 
autonomy doctrine, the exemption gives a religious organization freedom to “define and carry out 
their [own] religious missions” without governmental interference.50 The Amos decision displays 
the broad deference a church receives when it seeks to keep only its own members as employees, 
even for secular activities.51 In considering this, also note that the exemption has been interpreted 
to include employees bound by morals clauses.52 Such employees, regardless of faith, are required 
to comply with church teachings.  
 Although there are undoubtedly notable distinctions between the ministerial exception and 
the Title VII exemption, both clearly relate to the common protection of institutional autonomy.53 
Grounded in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the autonomy doctrine means that 
religious organizations have an interest in governing their own internal affairs such as selecting 
their own leaders, defining their own doctrines, and running their institutions, without interference 
from a secular court.54 As previously discussed, the autonomy doctrine has gone as far as 
demonstrating that religious organizations should be protected from religious employment 
discrimination lawsuits so long as the organization’s allegedly discriminatory conduct is for the 
institution’s own religious mission.55 The autonomy doctrine, constitutionalized in Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, has had and continues to have 
recognized progeny since its inception in the early 1950’s.56 The autonomy doctrine, as embedded 
 
49 Id.  
50 Id.   
51 Id.  
52 See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991) (A non-Catholic teacher brought a Title VII lawsuit against her 
former employer, a Catholic School, for failing to renew her contract because of her remarriage. The Court held that 
Title VII did not apply to the school’s decision to not rehire her.).   
53 See Carmella supra note 37, at 399-404. 
54 Amos, 483 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also, Laycock, supra note 19, at 1389.  
55 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
56 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); see also 
Laycock, supra note 19, at 1395. 
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in both Title VII’s religious employer exemption and in the ministerial exception, has always 
applied to churches and nonprofit organizations, rather than for-profits.57 The idea was that 
nonprofit institutions have a colorable claim that its operations will not be secular in nature and 
that any earnings the institution makes will finance the continued purpose of the institution, as 
opposed to a for-profit distributing earnings to its owners.58 
III. The Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs’ 
Proposed Regulations Definitions 
 The DOL Regulation’s purpose is to extend religious liberty to any federal contractor who 
wishes to exercise such liberty.59 This purpose is in clear accordance with the Executive Order and 
the AG’s Memo.60 The DOL Regulations accord with the Executive Order and the AG’s Memo is 
evident because each document highlights religion with paramount importance and makes clear 
that religious exercise deserves the utmost protection.61 Each of these documents also expressly 
state that this religious protection applies not only to individuals, but to organizations as well.62 
What the DOL Regulations will do, in effect, is allow federal contractors to hold themselves out 
to the public as a religious employer and allow them to make any of their employment decisions 
in adherence to their alleged religious purpose.63 The Federal Register expressly states that the 
DOL Regulation’s intention is to make clear that Executive Order 11246 does not apply to just 
churches, but employers with federal contracts as well.64 The way the DOL accomplishes this is 
 
57 See generally Laycock, supra note 19.  
58 Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
59 See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679.  
60 See generally Exec. Order supra note 1; see also Memorandum, supra note 4.  
61 See Exec. Order, supra note 1, see generally Memorandum, supra note 4, see generally Implementing Legal 
Requirements, supra note 11.  
62 See Exec. Order supra note 1, see generally Memorandum supra note 4, see generally Implementing Legal 
Requirements supra note 11. 
63 See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679. 
64 Id.  
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by expanding the definitions of certain terms, as noted above.65 The DOL Regulations broad 
definition of Religion will allow all exercises of religion to fall within protection.66 A potential 
issue in defining Religion so broadly, as this paper will discuss, is how broadly defined will all 
exercises of religion be? Such a broadly defined term begs the question of whether these 
regulations implicate, not only strictly “religious” practices, but moral convictions as well. By 
defining Particular religion so broadly, any hiring or firing decision by the employer can be based 
on that employer’s own religion.67 This expansive definition leads to the potential morals clauses 
that could be drafted in future, or amended, employment contracts.68 By defining Religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society so broadly, closely held for-profit 
corporations fall within the protection of these regulations.69 This paper contemplates if the DOL 
Regulations could ever be interpreted broadly enough to encompass larger businesses, such as for-
profit publicly traded companies, which were included in the Religious Exemption for 
contraceptive insurance coverage.70 Looking at the definitions of Exercise of religion and Sincere 
together, if a for-profit’s employment-based actions were merely driven by the owner’s personal 
religious beliefs then that conduct falls within the protection of the DOL Regulations as well.71 
 
65 See supra Introduction.  
66 See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679 (The OFCCP defines Religion as including, but 
not limiting to, all aspects of religious beliefs, observance, and practice).  
67 See id. (The OFCCP defines Particular religion as allowing “religious contractors not only to prefer in 
employment individuals who share their religion, but also to condition employment on acceptance of or adherence to 
religious tenets as understood by the employing contractor”).  
68 See Scharff, supra note 38.  
69 See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41681-41683 (The OFCCP defines Religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society by modifying the test set out in, Spencer v. World 
Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011), where (1) “the contractor must be organized for a religious purpose, 
meaning that it was conceived with a self-identified religious purpose. This need not be the contractor’s only 
purpose[,]” (2) “the contractor must hold itself out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose[,] . . . measured 
with reference to the particular religion identified by the contractor[,]” and (3) “the contractor must exercise religion 
consistent with, and in furtherance of, a religious purpose.” It is important to note that the OFCCP left out the fourth 
factor of the test that “the entity seeking exemption ‘not engage primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods 
or services for money beyond nominal amounts.’”).  
70 See id. and accompanying text; see also Religious Exemption, supra note 29.  
71 See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41684-41685. (internal citations omitted) (The OFCCP 
used the definition for Exercise of religion from RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
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The proposed definition of Sincere could make one contemplate if these religious missions will 
blend in moral precepts as well.72 The OFCCP has also proposed a but-for standard of causation 
in evaluating discrimination claims which will require the OFCCP to find a violation of Executive 
Order 11246 only if it can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a protected class, 
other than religion, was the but-for cause of the discrimination claim.73 
 This brings us to our two original questions posed: 1. Are the DOL Regulations a necessary 
implication of Hobby Lobby? And 2. Are the DOL Regulations extending the autonomy doctrine 
to for-profit organizations?  
A. The Department of Labor Regulations are Not a Necessary Implication of 
Hobby Lobby and the RFRA Progeny 
 What Hobby Lobby and the recently adopted Religious Exemption and Moral Exemption 
rules clearly relate to is an institution’s choice on whether or not to provide contraceptive insurance 
coverage.74 In contrast to the autonomy doctrine, which recognizes the autonomous decision 
making of certain topics within an institution, Hobby Lobby and the contraceptive regulations came 
to fruition through RFRA adjudication and differ because a substantial burden on religion needs 
to be shown in such context.75 It may be argued that the DOL Regulations are a necessary 
implication of Hobby Lobby because the Court, in that decision, did not differentiate between 
nonprofits and for-profits in the exercise of religion.76 Thus, the argument would be that since 
 
Act defining it as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 
The OFCCP went further stating that the Exercise of religion must be sincere, defining Sincere as “. . . whether a 
sincerely held religious belief actually motivated the institutions actions.”). 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); see also 45 
C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018).  
75 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993); see also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); 
see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018). 
76 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682. 
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nonprofits and for-profits are treated as persons, both types of entities should be given the same 
treatment with respect to religious liberty.77 The OFCCP even cites Hobby Lobby, among other 
cases, in support of the DOL Regulations.78  
 However, as previously mentioned, Hobby Lobby applied a strict scrutiny standard of 
review to determine whether a for-profit was substantially burdened by the contraceptive 
requirement.79 The government needed to show a compelling interest that the HHS’ mandate 
requiring certain closely held for-profits to provide contraceptive coverage was the least restrictive 
alternative.80 In ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby, majority opinion author, Justice Alito, articulated 
that the Court’s decision only covered the contraceptive mandate, meaning that it did not apply to 
all insurance-coverage mandates.81 Furthermore, Justice Alito explicitly narrowed the Hobby 
Lobby holding to the facts, stating that the decision would not be treated as a shield for employers 
to discriminate on the basis of religion.82 
 The DOL Regulations are not driven by Hobby Lobby, or RFRA, in general. The DOL 
Regulations make no mention that they are applying a strict scrutiny standard or that even a 
substantial burden must be established. Perhaps it could be, and has already been, argued that the 
implications of Hobby Lobby would begin a slippery slope of discriminatory employment-based 
 
77 Id. at 684 (The Court suggested that there was no Congressional intent that RFRA departed from the Dictionary 
Act, which does not differentiate between “persons” from “corporations”). 
78 See Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11, at 41679 (The OFCCP also cites to Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018) (Holding that a commission’s hostility towards an 
individual’s religious views violates the Free Exercise Clause), Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (Holding that a government agency denying a church an otherwise available public benefit 
because of their religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause), and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (Holding that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause bar a minister’s employment discrimination lawsuit against their church) in support of these regulations as 
well).  
79 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691-692.  
80 Id. at 726. 
81 Id. at 686.  
82 Id.  
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decisions protected by for-profit institutions’ religious liberties.83 But as will be discussed, 
institutional autonomy protections are much different, requiring no burden to be established for 
decisions solely pursuing religious missions.84  
B. The Department of Labor Regulations are an Extension of the Autonomy 
Doctrine to For-Profit Institutions 
 The DOL Regulations are a way of extending the autonomy doctrine. The autonomy 
doctrine, as previously mentioned, has allowed churches and nonprofits to internally govern their 
institutions in the ways they see fit, as well as being allowed to discriminate on the basis of religion 
in the employment process because 
[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from 
participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an 
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere 
aggregation of individuals. Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of 
an organization’s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission 
should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community defines itself. 
Solicitude for a church’s ability to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the 
autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as 
well.85 
 
The DOL Regulations are, in effect, allowing for-profits to conduct themselves in the same 
manner that churches and nonprofits do through institutional autonomy. Examining the definition 
of Particular religion,86 if an employee chose not to adhere to the religion of a business or chose 
to behave in a way that is unacceptable to that business because of its broadly defined religion, 
 
83 See generally Hannah Martin, Note, Race, Religion, and RFRA: The Implications Of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. In Employment Discrimination, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO (2016) (Arguing that the Hobby Lobby 
decision has race discrimination implications to its holding and an employer can easily hide this racial 
discrimination under a federal or a state RFRA statute).  
84 See generally Laycock, supra note 19.  
85 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  
86 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.   
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that employee may be terminated from their job. From this broader scenario, we can draw up a 
real-life hypothetical where an LGBTQ worker, who is married to an individual of the same sex, 
has been an apprentice for a federal contracting for-profit business for several months. If the DOL 
Regulations go into effect and the owner of that company decides to announce that they have a 
sincere belief that all employees must adhere to the tenets of the owner’s exercise of religion87 
which does not sincerely88  believe in same sex marriage, the DOL Regulations would allow that 
company to terminate that employee for not adhering to the owner’s religion. 
 In examining such a hypothetical, we can draw the conclusion that the DOL Regulations 
are an extension of the autonomy doctrine. The DOL Regulations do not flow from a balancing 
analysis like we would see in the RFRA context. Religious employers need not demonstrate any 
burden. Rather, the DOL Regulations would allow for-profits, like churches and nonprofits, to 
govern their institutions in ways they see fit, so long as they have a sincere religious belief. Harms 
that could arise from extending the autonomy doctrine to for-profits have dire consequences for 
the doctrine itself and certain groups of people. Thus, we will now examine the various 
consequences that may arise from extending autonomy-based protections.  
IV. The Department of Labor Regulations Should be Withdrawn Because they are 
an Extension of the Autonomy Doctrine 
 We must lastly ask ourselves: Should the autonomy doctrine be extended to for-profit 
institutions by virtue of the DOL Regulations? We must answer that question in the negative. The 
autonomy doctrine should not be extended to for-profit institutions and the DOL Regulations 
should be withdrawn because: 1. They will dilute the autonomy doctrine as applied to churches 
and nonprofits, 2. They will harm members of the LGBTQ, women, and minority groups in the 
 
87 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
88 Id.  
 17 
workforce, 3. This religious autonomy could extend to non-religious moral claims and even larger 
businesses, and 4. There is valuable policy in aspiring to have a diversified workplace.  
A. The Department of Labor Regulations Will Dilute the Autonomy Doctrine 
It can be observed that if we begin to view for-profits similarly as we do churches and 
nonprofits, with respect to religious liberty, we will be systemically placing for-profits on the same 
pedestal as we do churches and nonprofits. First, we should look to the long history of respecting 
and protecting the boundaries of separation of church and state which stems from the founding of 
our nation.89 Addressing the history of separating church and state demonstrates the importance of 
why we have the church autonomy doctrine. In adopting the First Amendment with its respective 
Religion Clauses, the founders wanted to ensure that, unlike the Church of England at that time, 
the government would not have a role in filling ecclesiastical positions and offices.90 A driving 
purpose for this was to refrain from having a national church forcefully project its religious views 
onto its own citizens by allowing the federal government to choose who its ministers will be.91 
Following the principles of the Religion Clauses, the Establishment Clause was to prevent the 
government from appointing ministers, while the Free Exercise Clause was to prevent the 
government from interfering with a church’s decision to select their own ministers.92 Title VII’s 
religious exemption, also based on church autonomy, further allows the hiring of co-religionists 
and those who will support the mission via a morals clause for any job, free from any religious 
discrimination concern.93 The value in allowing church autonomy and this idea of separation of 
 
89 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 183-184 (2012). 
90 Id.; see also Zoë Robinson, What is a "Religious Institution"?, 55 B.C.L. REV. 181, 223 (2014) (“The idea that 
religion operates outside the realm of politics can be traced back to James Madison’s 1776 Virginia Declaration of 
Rights and his 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. In the Memorial, Madison stated 
that a just government ‘will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religious with the 
same equal hand which protects his person and property.’”).  
91 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 183-184.  
92 Id. at 184.  
93 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1; see also Scharff, supra note 38.  
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church and state was only reaffirmed in subsequent United States Supreme Court cases.94 The 
significance in protecting the sanctity of a churches’ and nonprofits’ right to govern their own 
internal affairs is displayed even more so when these organizations seek to further their religious 
mission by participating in activities such as building churches and schools, educating children, 
and teaching moral values.95 By participating in such activities, individuals within that religious 
community get a robust sense of being apart of an even larger community.96 “Such a community 
represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere 
aggregation of individuals”97 and church autonomy deems it vital that such religious activities only 
be performed by members of that religious community.98 It is vital because not only are these 
institutions achieving their religious purpose, but they are also able to provide an example of their 
way of life to others.99 Seemingly, autonomy-based protections are not only important to larger 
religious communities as a whole, but also to individuals who already belong to them or those who 
would like to join them.100 
A church’s and nonprofit’s purpose for espousing their religious views onto others and 
requiring others in their institutions to adopt such views may been seen in contrast to a for-profit’s 
main purpose of financial gain and subsequently redistributing the profits.101 This distinction 
 
94 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) 
(Finding that the Russian Church of North America established and incorporated by a New York statute was 
“legislative fiat” violating the First Amendment. The Court further found that the designation of a clergyman to the 
St. Nicholas Cathedral rested with the church, as opposed to a secular judicial body); see also Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (Holding that the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s ruling of setting aside the removal of a bishop from a church as “arbitrary” was improper judicial 
interference with that church’s decision-making authority).  
95 See Laycock, supra note 19, at 1388-89.  
96 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 344.  
100 See Carmella, supra note 37, at 384-385.  
101 Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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demonstrates the dangers of expanding the doctrine and diluting its core purpose.102 The way that 
the doctrine becomes diluted is that essentially we are equating each type of institutions primary 
purpose and saying that these messages deserve the same amount of protection, namely, autonomy. 
When we parallel these missions and allow these equivalent protections, that means these 
protections can just as easily be taken away from nonprofit institutions compared to for-profit 
institutions.103  
Another way that the autonomy doctrine could become eroded by allowing for-profits such 
protection is that, in the case of a church or nonprofit, it is fairly clear to see what the institution’s 
religious mission is.104 The mission is displayed by how these institutions take advantage of their 
granted autonomy protections, for example, a church only allowing ministers of a particular faith 
to preach at their institution.105 However, in the for-profit context, it may not be so clear what the 
exact message of the institution is when, on one hand, the message could very well be to further 
their religious mission, while on the other hand, the mission could be to make a profit.106 For 
example, if a for-profit company had a boss that did not follow the company’s alleged religion but 
that boss brought in much business, that company would be very inclined to keep that boss, and 
perhaps would. One could only imagine more examples of how this doctrine becomes eroded by 
granting nonprofits and churches the same autonomy-based protections as entities whose primary 
purpose is to make money. Furthermore, for-profits are obviously economic actors that are central 
to our society.107 Individuals often seek to these institutions just to make a living which is also in 
 
102 See Carmella, supra note 37, at 418.  
103 Id. at 387.  
104 See generally Laycock, supra note 19.  
105 Id.; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).  
106 Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
107 Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369, 
391 (2013).  
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contrast to what can be said about churches and nonprofits.108 However, it is important to 
acknowledge that some businesses can have a religious belief where the owners may seek to fulfill 
a religious mission.109 But the fact that for-profits participate in the market means that their 
religious mission will be of a different nature than a church or nonprofit which is exclusively 
created for that mission.110 
B. The Department of Labor Regulations Will be Harmful to Members of the 
LGBTQ, Women, and Minority Groups in the Workforce 
The DOL Regulations will be unquestionably harmful to members of the LGBTQ, women, 
and minority groups. Although the DOL Regulations expressly address an employer’s continuing 
obligation not to discriminate based on protected classes other than religion, the DOL Regulations 
ensure that conscience and religious liberty will be given the broadest protection.111 Consequently, 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) has urged the DOL to withdraw the DOL Regulations, 
arguing that the DOL Regulations will make it much more difficult for employees to prove 
employment discrimination on the basis of a protected class other than religion.112 One difficulty 
for proving discrimination of a protected class that the ABA has cited is the new “but-for” standard 
that the DOL Regulations propose, as explained in Part III above.113 This standard will be 
undoubtedly difficult to meet in trying to prove that an employer’s grounds for termination based 
 
108 Id. (“Churches, when viewed from the perch of state agnosticism, are option pursuits. They do not govern access 
to wide swaths of employment or essential goods and services, and to the extent that church affiliated organizations 
do govern such access, we become less comfortable treating those organizations as churches.”). 
109 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).  
110 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340-342 
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
111 See generally Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11; see also Edwin Nieves, OFCCP News Release, 
U.S. Department Of Labor Proposes A Rule Clarifying Civil Rights Protections For Religious Organizations, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ofccp/ofccp20190814.  
112 Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA urges withdrawal of proposed rule that would expand religious exemption for federal 
contracts, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 19, 2019, 10:16 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba-urges-
withdrawal-or-proposed-rule-that-would-expand-religious-exemption-for-federal-contractors. 
113 Id.; see supra Part III.  
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on religion was merely a pretext for discrimination based on another protected class. In opposing 
the adoption of the DOL Regulations, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has also 
acknowledged the challenges that members of the LGBTQ and unmarried pregnant women would 
face.114 An indication that the DOL Regulations will harm LGBT members and workers is the fact 
that the proposed rule cites to Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, a case 
where a bakery owner denied baking a cake for a gay couple, without providing any protections 
for sexual orientation.115 For example, an employer would be able to terminate an employee on 
the basis of religion for merely being homosexual. The former employee would argue that religion 
was merely a pretext and that they were fired because of their sexual orientation. However, the 
employer could easily counter, citing that their sincere religious beliefs are only in heterosexuality. 
Since this belief is sincere, it is likely that the employer’s argument would succeed because as an 
autonomy protection, it does not matter whether the person is fired because they are a bad 
employee or because they are gay. Autonomy protection means the court defers regardless of the 
employer’s decision.116 It is also important to note that because it is difficult to question sincerity, 
this also allows anti-gay businesses to claim religious exemption even if they are not actually 
religious. While the DOL Regulations seem to require at least some showing of a sincere religious 
belief – that is to put it on the same footing as a church and religious nonprofit – that is the same 
as giving for-profits autonomy.117  
 
114 Catholic News Service Contributor, Bishops welcome proposed rule to protect rights of religious employers, 
CRUX (Aug. 22, 2019), https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-usa/2019/08/22/bishops-welcome-proposed-rule-to-
protect-rights-of-religious-employers/. 
115 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018); see also Mitchell, 
Hernandez, Chrisbens, OFCCP Proposes New Rule to “Ensure Religious Employers are Protected”, Jackson | 
Lewis (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.affirmativeactionlawadvisor.com/2019/08/ofccp-proposes-new-rule-to-ensure-
religious-employers-are-protected/. 
116 See generally Laycock, supra note 19.  
117 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
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The DOL Regulations would work in the same manner against women who are unmarried 
and pregnant as well as people who are nonreligious.118 Patricia Shiu (“Shiu”), former Director of 
the OFCCP under President Obama and now an advisor for the Berkeley Center on Comparative 
Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law, cautioned that the implementation of the DOL Regulations 
would “gut” anti-discrimination laws.119 Although the DOL reasons that religion can not be used 
as an excuse to discriminate against other protected classes, Shiu warns that these regulations have 
the potential to go as far as creating a “loophole” for employers and institutions to discriminate 
against anyone.120 Shiu provided an extreme loophole example where she believes that if an 
employer argued that their religion dictates that women cannot work outside of the home, the 
religious exemption would be justified to not hire women.121  
Another group of individuals the DOL Regulations would negatively impact are minorities. 
In this context, a religious nonprofit, that has a federal government contract, could refuse to hire 
those who are Muslim or Jewish or who refuse to sign a morals contract because the employer 
only adheres to Catholicism.122 Under the DOL Regulations, this also seems to be an acceptable 
form of religious discrimination.123 
As mentioned earlier, it is important to consider President Obama’s signing off of 
Executive Order 13672, amending Executive Order 11246, to include protections for employees 
of federal contractors on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.124 The DOL 
 
118 Emma Green, How Trump Is Reversing Obama’s Nondiscrimination Legacy, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/trump-lgbtq-rules/596116/. 
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Regulations will lead to a systematic weakening of President Obama’s Executive Order.125 A poll 
released in late 2017 by NPR, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and the Harvard T.H. Chan 
School of Public Health found that at least 20% LGBTQ people experienced discrimination when 
applying for employment because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.126 This statistic 
rose to 32% with respect to LGBTQ people of color.127 Looking at these numbers and considering 
the implications of the DOL Regulations, it becomes apparent that these numbers will only 
increase if the DOL Regulations are enacted. And not only will these numbers increase but the 
employer will now be able to defend themselves from a discrimination lawsuit with a seemingly 
impenetrable shield.  
i. The “Morals Clause Issue” in Employment Contracts with Current and 
Future Employees who are LGBTQ Members, Women, and Minorities 
 When we further consider morals clauses that are part of many church and religious 
nonprofit employment agreements, this issue becomes worse.128 If the DOL Regulations are 
enacted, that could lead to many for-profit employers forcing their future employees, or trying to 
amend with their current employees, employment contracts that have morals clauses to conform 
the employee’s conduct inside and outside of the workplace with the religious tenets of the 
employer. For example, a religious employer of a for-profit may be able to get any worker to agree 
to not engage in sexual activity and/or get pregnant out of wedlock. While this may seem like a 
pretext for sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination, under the DOL Regulations, this 
 
125 Frank J. Bewkes and Caitlin Rooney, The Nondiscrimination Protections of Millions of Workers Are Under 
Threat, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Sept., 3, 2019, 9:02 AM), 
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126 Discrimination In America: Experiences And Views Of LGBTQ Americans, NPR (November 2017), 
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128 See Scharff, supra note 38.  
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seems completely reasonable on the end of the employer who is just abiding to the doctrine of their 
religious beliefs.  
In 2014, in Catholic schools across the United States, it was seen that teachers were being 
required to agree to morality clauses forbidding conduct such as using birth control and marrying 
a member of the same sex.129 An example from where this took place was in Oakland, California, 
at Bishop O’Dowd High School.130 Teachers at this Catholic School were required to sign new 
contracts that included morality clauses.131 A mother of students at this school viewed the teachers’ 
new employment contracts online, including the morality clauses, and became worrisome of 
language that required teachers to follow the Catholic doctrine, not only in the classroom, but in 
their personal lives too.132  
The reality that these morals clause agreements have been a prerequisite requirement in the 
nonprofit sector further exacerbates the negative impact that the DOL Regulations will have on 
LGBTQ workers, women, and minority groups in the for-profit sector. In a world where one in 
five LGBTQ workers felt that they were discriminated against when applying for employment 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity,133 it is difficult to imagine that there will not be 
morals clauses drafted that are, at least, subtly discriminatory. However, even if these morals 
clauses are drafted in such a manner, the pretext of a religious conviction will trump the alleged 
discrimination, and the employer’s morals clause provision will have to be adhered to.  
C. The Department of Labor Regulations Could Extend Religious Autonomy to 
Moral Autonomy and Larger Businesses 
 
129 Sandhya Dirks, Morals Clauses Prove Controversial For Catholic School Teachers, NPR (Jul. 15, 2014, 4:58 
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 Earlier it was discussed that following the Hobby Lobby decision the Trump administration 
established both a Religious Exemption and a Moral Exemption for businesses that object to 
providing contraceptive coverage.134 Although this paper argues that the Hobby Lobby decision is 
not a necessary implication of the DOL Regulations, it could be argued that adopting the DOL 
Regulations could lead to a parallel situation in how the Religious Exemption and Moral 
Exemption for contraceptive coverage were adopted. Hobby Lobby, as discussed, was a religious 
exemption case and then years later the Trump administration adopted the Religious Exemption 
and Moral Exemption.135 This part of the argument contemplates that the DOL Regulations 
actually regulate only what they explicitly say they will regulate, namely, religion. The argument 
here is that: Following the adoption of the DOL Regulations, could years later the DOL 
Regulations be expanded more broadly to include moral autonomy-based protections?  I propose 
that this is a foreseeable consequence from the context just discussed. For example, if the DOL 
Regulations are enacted and President Trump is reelected, it is possible that his administration 
could broaden the DOL Regulations even further to include moral autonomy. The administration 
could accomplish this by expanding on the definitions from the DOL Regulations to include the 
“moral conviction” test, based from Welsh and utilized in the Moral Exemption, which parallels 
the protections provided to sincere religious beliefs with sincere ethical and moral beliefs.136 
 This potential slippery slope of expanding to autonomy on a religious and moral level 
would lead to further dilution of the doctrine and even further harm for certain individuals of our 
society. For example, if an employee was homosexual and an employer cited to some “moral 
 
134 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2018).  
135 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018); 
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conviction,” as opposed to citing to a sincere religious belief against homosexuals, that would be 
enough for the employer to terminate that employee. Just from this simple example, one could 
draw up thousands of potential scenarios that could occur because of the implications of the DOL 
Regulations. This would also make the new “but-for” standard even more difficult to meet by 
essentially conflating religious discrimination decisions with moral claims by the employer.  
 Additionally, the Religious Exemption for contraceptive coverage includes for-profits that 
are publicly traded.137 In arguing that the Religious Exemption and Moral Exemption enactment 
could parallel the DOL Regulations, that potentially means that religious autonomy-based 
protections could expand to businesses larger than for-profit closely held companies. This 
argument comes to fruition even more so when we look at the definition of Religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society and further analyze that the drafters of the DOL 
Regulations left out the fourth factor of the Ninth Circuit World Vision test which states that an 
entity looking for a Title VII religious exemption may not substantially engage in money 
transactions for goods and services beyond nominal amounts.138 This is markedly different from 
the DOL Regulations which evidently allows businesses to be involved in money transactions with 
no “nominal” cap, an ability to earn a profit, and still qualify as a religious entity.139 
 The consequences of enacting of the DOL Regulations could expand the autonomy 
doctrine further than we had ever realized leading to irreparable harm. The potential positive 
changes it could do for legitimate religious for-profits does not outweigh the extraordinary harm 
that would be done if the DOL Regulations are passed. 
D. It is Beneficial Policy to Aspire to Have Diversity in the Workplace 
 
137 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018). 
138 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
139 See generally Implementing Legal Requirements, supra note 11; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
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Reasons for having diversity in the workplace go beyond political correctness.140 Diversity 
in the workplace helps companies compete with other companies around the world that are already 
encouraging diversity.141 For example, if an employer wants to engage in business in a country 
that is overseas, like many other businesses already do, having an employee who understands that 
country’s language and culture, may be best to handle or at least consult on that particular work 
assignment. Encouraging a diversified employment environment can lead to less turnover because 
all employees will feel valued and the employer has the chance to engage in ideas with employees 
from all walks of life.142 A diversified workplace can also lead to the employer increasing 
flexibility by recognizing the differences between people from different cultures.143 For example, 
if an employer were requiring his current or future employee to sign a morals clause provision in 
their employment contract to adhere to that employer’s faith or they will be terminated, that 
employee may be inclined to lie in signing that provision just to maintain or gain employment. 
However, this employee will likely feel valueless that they have to lie to their employer about who 
they are in order to maintain steady income or risk termination. That employee will feel especially 
undervalued if their religion or culture is a large part of their personal life. Furthermore, this 
employer has now officially lost out on some potentially new ideas that may come from this 
employee’s different culture.  
As was addressed in Part IV, minorities and women are groups of people that can be 
harmed by the implementation of the DOL Regulations. Different studies have suggested that a 
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promotion of fairness and equality in the workplace can lead to positive outcomes for a business, 
such as low turnover144, and may also alleviate workplace conflicts such as interpersonal bias.145 
In the upcoming decades, the United States has been projected to become “minority white” which 
means that minorities groups will become the majority.146 The data shows that non-Hispanic 
whites will be just under 50% of the population by the year 2045.147 This rise in the minority 
population only further increases by the time we get to the year 2060.148 The increasing population 
of minorities further displays that it will be imperative to have a diversified workplace in the near 
future and that aspiring to such a policy now will only benefit businesses. 
 Recognizing the benefits of having a diversified workplace policy supports the conclusion 
that the DOL Regulations should be withdrawn. While it is imperative to recognize the importance 
of allowing certain entities to adhere to a religious belief in order to further their message,149 in the 
for-profit sector it could be critical to not have a diversified workplace. A for-profit institution that 
recognizes only way one thinking and refuses to be open-minded to other cultures loses a 
competitive advantage150 and may hurt the for-profit business in achieving at least one of its main 
goals - making a profit.  
CONCLUSION 
 
144 See generally, E.H. Buttner et al., Diversity Climate Impact on Employee of Color Outcomes: Does Justice 
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The importance of autonomy granted to churches and nonprofit institutions is undoubtedly 
clear and the doctrine’s protections are undeniably significant. Allowing such protections to 
institutions of these types is critical to their growth because their development primarily relies on 
furthering the message of their religious mission.151 The DOL Regulations seek to expand on this 
doctrine by including for-profit institutions.152 This is not the case, as seen in Hobby Lobby and 
through RFRA adjudication, where there must be a substantial burden proven to show that a law 
or policy cannot survive strict scrutiny.153 Nor are the DOL Regulations merely seeking to disallow 
a particular type of health insurance coverage, such as, contraceptive coverage.154 As noted, the 
OFCCP chose to cite Hobby Lobby as support for the DOL Regulations in the same breath that it 
cited to Hosanna-Tabor.155 As made evident by this paper, Hobby Lobby was an explicitly narrow 
decision only covering contraceptive coverage,156 as opposed to giving broad religious protection 
to all for-profits. Hosanna-Tabor, on the other hand, barred a minister’s employment 
discrimination lawsuit protecting a church’s internal self-governance, in general.157 The DOL 
Regulations propose something much closer to the Hosanna-Tabor and Amos decisions which give 
for-profit institutions autonomy-based protections.158  
 “In short, the rule would serve as a devastating blow to religious freedom in the name of 
protecting it.”159 The DOL Regulations are not a necessary implication of Hobby Lobby. Rather, 
the DOL Regulations are an extension of the autonomy doctrine to for-profit institutions. 
Therefore, the DOL Regulations should be withdrawn because 1. They will dilute the autonomy 
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doctrine as applied to churches and nonprofits, 2. They will harm members of the LGBTQ, women, 
and minority groups in the workforce, 3. This religious autonomy protection could extend to non-
religious moral claims and even larger businesses, and 4. There is value in having a diversified 
workplace.  
  
